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Although more competitive forms of authoritarianism and electoral democ-
racy are today prevalent in most African countries, democratisation has 
slowed and in some places reversed. This coincides with an ever-growing 
rift between African citizens who are demanding further democratic rights 
and rulers who want to preserve their prerogatives. Western actors need to 
support those who hold the greatest democratic aspirations more fervently: 
African citizens themselves.
 • Western support has contributed to democratic development in Africa via 
two channels. First, political conditionality and “democratic sanctions” have 
increased the costs for leaders who severely infringe human and democratic 
rights. Second, Western intervention has helped to increase citizens’ awareness 
and their opposition to their regimes. Yet, the effect of external intervention 
has clear limits: no African country that has been subject to Western demo-
cratic sanctions since 1990 has become fully democratic.
 • Despite the discussions about a specific African variant of democracy – for in-
stance, one which places greater emphasis on traditional authorities – the ma-
jority of African citizens support the procedural tenets of liberal democracy and 
universal human rights. This sentiment largely holds across countries with dif-
ferent levels of democracy and with varying exposure to external intervention. 
 • The majority of Africans consider local elites to be primarily responsible for 
democratic progress; Africans value national sovereignty more highly than re-
gional responsibility. In particular, the absence of one specific African demo-
cratic model and African citizens’ high regard for national sovereignty renders 
context-sensitive external support all the more important.
Policy Implications
Seen against the rise of China and other authoritarian powers, Western influence 
is declining in relative terms. However, Western countries still have an impor-
tant role to play in supporting democracy in Africa. Western assistance should 
be citizen-centred and involve consistent support for civic education and com-
mon training programmes for young leaders across the political divide.
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Rising Popular Demand for Democracy in Africa 
African citizens’ quest for democracy is strong and growing. According to recently 
published Afrobarometer survey data, close to 70 per cent of Africans prefer democ-
racy to any other political regime and only 9.7 per cent state that a non- democratic 
government can be preferable in certain circumstances. In the 32 countries sur-
veyed in round six of the Afrobarometer (conducted in 2014 and 2015), more than 
half of Africans are “deep democrats” – that is, they support democracy and reject 
all three autocratic alternatives (military rule, single-party rule, and personalist 
rule). The exclusive demand for democracy has grown strongly, rising from 36 per 
cent in 2002 to 51 per cent in 2012 in the 16 African countries surveyed in rounds 
two to five of the Afrobarometer (Bratton and Houessou 2014). Yet this should not 
disguise huge disparities. While 78 per cent of interviewees in Zambia voiced both 
support for democracy and rejected all types of authoritarian rule, only 20 per cent 
to 25 per cent of respondents did so in Madagascar, Sudan, and Mozambique. 
Africa has always been a prime target for interventions by external forces, be 
they great powers, non-governmental organisations, business corporations, or 
inter national organisations. The causes are manifold and range from “failing and 
collapsed” statehood (Zartman 1995), civil war, comparatively low development 
levels, to interests in the continent’s vast natural resources. Especially Western 
powers have also aimed at promoting democratic governance reforms. 
Does this intervention make a difference? Do citizens in African countries that 
have been subject to severe external pressure in the form of “democratic sanctions” 
and, in addition, to concomitant UN peacekeeping perceive democracy differently 
than those in countries that have not? To further differentiate political systems’ 
democratic credentials in Africa, we use the broad Freedom House categorisation of 
“free,” “partly free,” and “not free” countries. According to the 2016 Freedom House 
Report (Freedom House 2016), democracies constitute a minority: only 9 of the 49 
fully recognised sub- Saharan African countries are considered “free” (i.e. fully dem-
ocratic); of the remaining 40, 20 are classified as “not free,” and 20 as “partly free.” 
As can be seen from Figure 1, support for democracy is remarkably consistent 
across (a) country designations (“free,” “partly free,” and “not free”) and (b) experi-
ences with external interventions. Citizens in African countries that have been 
subject to foreign intervention(s) since 1990 do not perceive democracy in a sys-
tematically different manner than those in countries that have been free of foreign 
intervention. Note, however, that Afrobarometer surveys have only been conducted 
in 7 of the 20 countries rated “not free” – 5 of which have been the targets of exter-
nal intervention (Burundi, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Cameroon). In contrast, 
surveys have been conducted in all 9 countries designated as “free” and in 17 of the 
20 “partly free” countries.
A further Afrobarometer question demonstrates that African citizens’ under-
standing of the main tenets of democracy – similar to that of citizens in other world 
regions – focuses on key liberal-democratic values and processes, such as personal 
freedoms, multiparty competition, and government accountability. (The Afrobar-
ometer question asked, “What, if anything, does ‘democracy’ mean to you?”) For the 
majority of Africans, the quality of elections is the main factor that determines the 
nature of the political systems in their respective countries. 
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External Interventions’ Limited yet Important  
Effects on Democratic Development
Interventions by external powers have fundamentally shaped the democratic trajec-
tory in sub-Saharan Africa. With the end of the Cold War, democracy and  human 
rights rose on the global agenda, and Western states increased their pressure on 
authoritarian regimes to democratise. Consequently, Western governments in-
creasingly linked the allocation of development assistance to democratic reform in 
recipient countries. They also tried to foster democracy through electoral observa-
tion as well as through the support provided to parliamentarians, political  parties, 
electoral commissions, the judiciary, the media, and civil society organisations 
(Brown 2013: 407). At the other end of the spectrum, African countries have been a 
prime target of Western “democratic sanctions” aimed at fostering and safeguard-
ing demo cratic rights and processes abroad (Portela and von Soest 2012). 
The effects of these interventions are contested but democracy promotion and 
pressure have overall contributed to a strengthening of democracy and the end of most 
hard forms of dictatorship on the continent. Dietrich and Wright (2015), for instance, 
observe that economic aid increases the likelihood of transition to multiparty poli-
tics, while direct democracy aid reduces the failure of multiparty regimes and limits 
electoral misconduct, thereby supporting democratic development. Carter (2016) also 
shows that Western powers can fundamentally increase the costs for African autocrats 
who violate human and democratic rights, particularly in aid-dependent countries, via 
political conditions attached to the provision of aid. However, no African country that 
has been subject to severe external intervention since 1990, be it Western sanctions 
or UN peacekeeping, has made the transition to “free” status (Namibia, which is rated 
“free,” represents a special case in this regard as it only became an independent state 
in March 1990). In this respect external interventions have continued to be unsuccess-
ful in creating or contributing to full democracy. (It is important to note, however, that 
external intervention might systematically select the most difficult cases.) 
Figure 1. 
Public Support for 
Democracy
Data sources: Afro bar-
ometer (2016), Round 6; 
Freedom House 2016. 
Note: Public support 
for democracy versus 
other forms of govern-
ance according to  
(a) “free,” “partly free,” 
and “not free” status and 
(b) to the country having 
been subject to external 
interventions (Western 
sanctions and/or peace-
keeping operations) or 
not. The “not free” with-
out external intervention 
category only comprises 
Gabon and Swaziland.
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The democratic development of those African countries that have seen severe 
external interventions, similar to those that have not, has remained uneven over 
the last 25 years. This confirms the fact that external intervention is only a second-
ary factor in influencing local political and social dynamics. Only a small group of 
countries that transitioned from “not free” to “partly free” have been able to main-
tain this status. This includes Kenya, sanctioned in the beginning of the 1990s, and 
Liberia, which rose to “partly free” status in 2005 when a transitional government 
introduced greater political freedom following the ouster of President Charles Tay-
lor in August 2003. 
A larger group has remained unstable and oscillates between being seen as 
“partly free” and “not free.” This includes the Central African Republic, which 
dropped from “partly free” to “not free” in 2004, rose back to “partly free” in 2006, 
and since 2014 has been classified as “not free” due to severe turmoil in the country. 
Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, and Mauritania have shown similar variation over the years. 
Other countries have exhibited a clear downward trend. For example, Ethiopia re-
gressed and has been rated “not free” since 2010. Guinea-Bissau and Uganda, sanc-
tioned in the beginning of the 1990s, had been considered “partly free” for more 
than 20 years, but dropped to “not free” more recently. Finally, there are also nu-
merous countries that have been subject to external interventions that Freedom 
House has consistently rated “not free” since 1990 – namely, Chad, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan. 
This assessment confirms the generally limited contribution of external inter-
ventions in bringing about full liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. However, 
it also shows that Western support has played an important role in facilitating the 
transition to, albeit imperfect, multiparty politics in Africa. In addition, democratic 
sanctions have an overall slightly positive effect on the protection of political and 
civil rights in targeted countries (von Soest and Wahman 2015).
The Elusive Quest for One African Model of Democracy
Popular demand for democracy on the African continent should not imply that lib-
eral democracy is without its discontents. Most importantly, some prominent Af-
rican thinkers and leaders see its emphasis on individual rights and electoral com-
petition as alien to the continent’s purported precolonial tradition of safeguarding 
communal rights and consensus building. Tanzania’s first president, Julius Nyerere 
(1975), early on asserted that his ujamaa (“familyhood”) socialism – with its four 
main facets of consciousness, equality, villagisation, and democracy – in conjunc-
tion with a single-party state would better fit the customs and structures of African 
society. While there is no longer any real discussion about the political advantages 
of traditional one-party states in Africa, a widespread sentiment exists that the 
“strong role of religious, ethnic, and communal ties [sits] uneasily with the Western 
emphasis placed on individual rights” (Youngs 2015: 49). It is contested whether 
imported templates of liberal democracy can adequately deal with the development 
challenges and multi-ethnic character of African societies. For Ake (1996), this form 
of government is in itself not “emancipatory” and is therefore insufficient to safe-
guard the rights of African citizens vis-à-vis the political elite and to fight economic 
marginality. 
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In addition, many saw the spread of liberal democracy after the end of the Cold 
War as being inherently tied to the pressure to adopt much-despised neo-liberal 
economic reform on the continent. Today, African elites increasingly call into ques-
tion the superiority of democracies in providing legitimate and effective govern-
ance. The varied successes of Western democracy in overcoming political and eco-
nomic crises as well as the increasing self-confidence and growing power on the 
global stage of authoritarian regimes further dent liberal democracy’s attractive-
ness (Plattner 2015). 
Most African societies value communitarian values and consensus more highly 
than other societies. Also, traditional authorities are often integrated into the village 
level – in Botswana, for example, this is through the kgotla system (Molomo 2014). 
The common denominator is to encourage local specificity and consensual power-
sharing and to generate stronger support for new forms of participation, particularly 
at the local level. Yet, despite the search for local variants of democracy, the Afrobar-
ometer survey provides evidence of African citizens’ strong support for safeguarding 
universal human and democratic rights and the fundamental tenets of democracy.
The political and social conditions in Africa, and even within African countries, 
are extremely diverse, which makes it difficult – if not impossible – to develop a 
coherent variant of democracy. There is no uniform set of values and traditions. As 
affirmed by Gyimah-Boadi (2015) and Khadiagala (2016), African political tradi-
tions contain not only democratic but also authoritarian facets. It is noteworthy 
that the most prominent current purported proponents of “African democracy,” 
such as Uganda’s President Museveni and Rwanda’s President Kagame, repeatedly 
misuse this term to reduce the rights of the political opposition and the freedom 
of the independent media and, ultimately, to legitimise their non-democratic rule. 
Overall, the contours of a single model of African democracy are not yet vis-
ible. Analysts converge (a) in their criticism of the simple application of Western 
concepts and the colonial and postcolonial transfer of institutional templates to 
Africa (Mkandawire 2015; Mbembe 2000) and (b) in their appreciation of context-
sensitive variants of democracy. For instance, Tendai Biti, a prominent opposition 
politician from Zimbabwe, questions the applicability of the British first-past-the-
post electoral system to the social and political conditions in his country. [1] This 
makes the case for providing assistance to African citizens to devise their own way 
of strengthening democracy based on the democratic values they support. 
Creating New Enthusiasm for Democracy Support in Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is characterised by very different political trajectories, but over-
all democratic progress has come to a halt. Numerous countries (at least the 20 
out of 49 recognised states rated as “partly free”) today operate in a “grey zone” 
between autocracy and liberal democracy. The strongest supporters of democracy 
on the continent are without any doubt its citizens, whereas the “embrace of demo-
cratic ideals by African regional bodies and some members of the political elite in 
the early 2000s was short-lived” (Gyimah-Boadi 2015: 107). 
This is despite the fact that regional conventions and the provisions against the 
“unconstitutional change of government” have contributed to an overall positive 
democratic development in Africa since the end of the Cold War. Regional electoral 
1 Interview Christian  
von Soest with Tendai Biti, 
27 June 2016, Berlin. 
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monitoring, although often being lenient, has become a routine procedure and the 
African Union (AU) and subregional organisations have imposed sanctions on vari-
ous occasions, for instance on the Central African Republic (2003–2005; 2013 to 
date), Togo (2005), Mauritania (2005–2007; 2008–2009), Guinea (2008–2011), 
Niger (2010–2011), Cote d’Ivoire (2010–2011), and Mali (2012). 
However, Africans see the prevention of government abuses and the safeguard-
ing of democratic values as resting primarily with domestic actors. According to 
Afrobarometer data, on average 57 per cent of interviewees in sub-Saharan Africa 
value national sovereignty more highly than the “regional responsibility to prevent 
abuses,” and only 36 per cent agree that African governments “have a duty to try 
to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in other countries in 
the region, for example by using political pressure, economic sanctions or military 
force” (see Figure 2). 
Only in one country, Burkina Faso, did interviewees report a preference for 
regional intervention, with 65 per cent affirming a duty to guarantee free elections 
and prevent human rights abuses in other countries. Given the country’s political 
crisis in 2014, this result inherently makes sense. At that time, President Blaise 
Compaoré, who governed from 1987 up until 2014, faced protests against an an-
ticipated change to the Constitution that would have allowed him to prolong his 
rule; he finally resigned following a coup d’état. Regional bodies such as the AU 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) were instrumen-
tal in facilitating and pressuring for a negotiated settlement. The immediate crisis 
ended with the presidential election in November 2015, which was won by the op-
position politician Roch Marc Kaboré. Societies that are split between intervention 
and independence are Togo, Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Burundi, and Swaziland – all 
countries that have been ravaged by domestic crises that will be difficult to resolve 
without external intervention. Notably, the approval for regional intervention to 
safeguard democratic values remains significantly lower in “free” countries. In Na-
mibia, for example, only 22.4 per cent of citizens voice a preference for regional 
intervention.
Figure 2. 
Regional Responsibil-
ity to Prevent Abuses
Data sources: Afro bar-
ometer (2016), Round 6; 
Freedom House 2016.
Note: Responses to 
the statement: “regional 
responsibility to prevent 
abuses vs. respect sover-
eignty of nations” (Afro-
barometer, Round 6).
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Overall, it is clear that African citizens consider national sovereignty an impor-
tant value and seem prepared to accept (regional) external intervention in times of 
emergency only. In acute crises, opposition actors often argue in favour of external 
pressure – the international campaign against the former South African apartheid 
government being the continent’s most prominent example.
For all their faults, Western interventions have contributed to the overall positive 
democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War. They 
alone have not been successful in bringing about liberal democratic governance, but 
in many cases they have supported “partly free” political order, be it electoral democ-
racy or competitive authoritarianism. In particular, the absence of a single model of 
African democracy and African citizens’ high regard for national sovereignty ren-
der context-sensitive external intervention all the more important. Based on what 
Khadiagala (2016: 3) calls a “growing consensus among citizens about the centrality 
of the basic universal norms and values that constitute democracy,” external inter-
vention should – even more so than in the past – focus on citizen empowerment to 
strengthen the accountability of governments on the African continent. 
Besides leading by example and guaranteeing legitimate and effective demo-
cratic governance at home, Western governments can support African citizens’ in 
developing their own democratic paths. A promising instrument already utilised 
by some political foundations – particularly in highly polarised societies – is the 
support of young leadership training programmes that bring together promising 
talent from the media, NGOs, the business sector, and parties across the political 
divide. The consistent support for civic education and funding of local initiatives 
dedicated to democratic values are further useful tools. In the most severe cases 
of human and democratic rights violations, external pressure on governments may 
amplify domestic opposition by making governments’ actions more costly. External 
intervention can, for instance, help to put pressure on African rulers who attempt to 
remove constitutional term limits to prolong their rule (Carter 2016).
Low levels of enthusiasm for democracy among elites in many African coun-
tries, the growing assertiveness of authoritarian powers, particularly China, and the 
contestation of democratic governance in many parts of the world make consistent 
and adaptive external support for democratic progress not only more difficult but 
also all the more important. It is essential that external actors consistently back the 
real torchbearers of African democracy: African citizens.
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